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STUDENT NOTE
REPORTING THE TRUTH AND SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S.
AND JAPANESE LIBEL LAWS
Ellen M. Smith*
Modem democracies face the constant challenge of balancing societal
needs with individual interests.' This struggle is especially apparent in
libel law, where the importance of advancing widespread debate on
controversial issues often clashes with the common law right of individu-
als to be protected from defamatory falsehoods. Freedom of the press is
considered a keystone of democracy, and its development has been
central to the historical struggle for the rule of law.2 The tort of
defamation, on the other hand, begins with the premise that an individu-
al's reputation should be protected from false words that might injure it.'
A central task of modem defamation law, therefore, is to reconcile
society's interest in robust and truthful speech with the individual interest
in reputation. The appropriate balance cannot allow absolute protection
of one at the expense of the other.
The United States has chosen to weigh this balance in favor of press
freedoms, while arguably neglecting to protect individuals' reputations.
Libel plaintiffs, especially public figures, face the difficult task of
overcoming the media's strong constitutional protections. In order to
prevail, the plaintiff must prove the media acted recklessly, maliciously,
and without regard for the truth in publishing the alleged defamation.
The media's ability to prove the truth of the statement is far less
important than its intent in making the statement.
In contrast, Japan has developed an approach to libel weighted more
toward protecting individual interests. Under Japanese law, the media
* University of Minnesota, B.A. (1987); University of Michigan Law School, J.D. (1993).
1. See Nobushige Ukai, The Signification of the Reception of American Constitutional
Institutions and Ideas in Japan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: ASIAN VIEWS OF THE
AMERicAN INFLUENCE 114, 120-21 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1979).
2. Pnina Lahav, Conclusion: An Outline for a General Theory of Press Law in
Democracy, in PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOcRAcIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 339 (Pnina
Lahav ed., 1985) [hereinafter PRESS LAW].
3. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 177 (5th L.
Ed. 1984).
4. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1066 (5th ed. 1990).
5. See infra part I.A.
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carries the burden of proving truth as a defense to the alleged defamation.
Remedies focus less on compensation and more on restoring the defamed
individual's place in society.6
Although Japan places seemingly stiffer standards on media defen-
dants in libel suits, when viewed against the backdrop of the countries'
respective cultures, the U.S. and Japanese press enjoy similar freedoms.
In terms of social development, however, Japanese libel law is more
successful in addressing both the truthfulness of the offending statement
and the individual's reputation in the larger community.7 U.S. libel
jurisprudence lacks the therapeutic societal benefits found under Japanese
law.
Despite the cultural differences between the United States and Japan,
the nations' respective approaches to libel law provide useful compari-
sons. The media industries of the two nations enjoy the highest total
press circulation in the world,8 and both nations are major world
economic powers. In addition, both countries' constitutions contain
similar free speech provisions. 9
This Note argues that U.S. courts and lawmakers should adopt some
aspects of Japanese libel law.'0 Part I compares the balances struck in
U.S. and Japanese libel law between promoting press freedoms and
protecting individual interests. Part II focuses on the extent to which
6. See infra part I.B.
7. See the remedies discussion in Okuri v. Kageyama. Judgment of July 4, 1956 (Okuri
v. Kageyama), Saik~sai [Supreme Court], 10 Minshi 785 (Japan), translated in THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 324 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1988)
[hereinafter JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM]. The Japanese Supreme Court ordered a political
candidate to retract defamatory statements he made about his opponent during an election,
stating that "[r]eputation is a social concept, and thus this type of notice of apologies can be
recognized as a sensible and valid method for the restoration of the reputation of the injured
party." Id.
8. THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER ON CENSORSHIP, ARTICLE 19, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND EXPRESSION IN JAPAN: A COMMENTARY AND THE 1988 REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN 16 (1989) [hereinafter ARTICLE
19 REPORT]. The report lists Japan as having the third largest media circulation behind the
United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. With the breakup of the former
Soviet Union, the Japanese press may have moved into second place.
9. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
10. This Note uses the terms "libel" and "defamation" to refer only to defamation
published in the conventional media, and not to defamation actions among private individuals.
The term "press" is used to encompass both print and broadcast media, even though most libel
suits in both countries are brought against newspapers and magazines. See LAWRENCE W.
BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY 316 (1984) (stating that most libel complaints in Japan are filed against newspapers
and pulp magazines); RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND
REALITY 242 (1987) (stating that most U.S. libel suits are filed against newspapers, with a
significantly smaller proportion filed against television stations).
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each system succeeds in addressing the objectives of encouraging
aggressive, accurate reporting, and compensating libel victims. Finally,
Part III proposes a new U.S. libel standard that would adopt, with some
modifications, key elements of Japanese libel law without running afoul
of established U.S. constitutional requirements.
I. LIBEL LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Freedoms of speech and press in the United States and Japan are
protected by similar provisions in each nation's constitution. The First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution holds that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[.]" " The
Japanese Kenp6 Article XXI promises that "[fireedom of... speech,
press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship
shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication
be violated."'
' 2
Despite the similarities in the constitutional protection of press
freedoms, U.S. and Japanese courts have developed different theories for
examining the potential injuries and remedies connected with defamation.
While the U.S. approach tends to view the costs of defamation in private
terms, the Japanese method considers the injury in regard to how it
affects society. 3 This difference is based, in part, on the countries'
differing cultural traditions, and is evident at all levels of libel jurispru-
dence.
A. Actual Malice: The U.S. Approach to Libel Litigation
In the United States, libel jurisprudence developed around the theory
that robust public debate provides the best insurance against tyranny. As
articulated by John Stuart Mill, this classic libertarian argument held that
suppression of opinion was wrong - regardless of its truth or falsity.'4
If the suppressed opinion were true, society would be denied the truth.
If it were false, society would be denied the fuller understanding of the
truth that results from the conflict between truth and falsity in the
marketplace of ideas. 5 Mill believed that society would wholly embrace
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. KENP6 [Constitution] art. XXI (Japan), translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONS].
13. See infra part II.B. and text accompanying notes 34-37.
14. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-56 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
15. Justice Holmes was a strong proponent of Mill's approach. In Abrams v. United
States, he wrote, "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
Summer 1993)
Michigan Journal of International Law
only those truthful opinions that had been tested through debate and
conflict.' 6 Thus, under Mill's vision, free and open debate was essential
to the workings of a representative government. The harm caused by the
occasional falsehood that slipped undetected through the marketplace of
ideas was simply one cost of a free press.
The U.S. Supreme Court embraced Mill's approach in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 7 the decision that essentially brought the tort of
defamation within the ambit of the First Amendment. The case involved
the publication of a political advertisement inaccurately describing an
incident involving police treatment of nonviolent protestors in Montgom-
ery, Alabama, during the height of the Civil Rights Movement. In
determining that the New York Times had not libeled the plaintiff, a
Montgomery police commissioner, Justice Brennan noted that "[w]e
consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials."'
Is
In Sullivan, the Court added a requirement of actual malice to the
elements that must be proved under the common law tort test for libel. 9
After the decision, public officials could only prevail in libel actions
stemming from reports on their official activities by proving that the
published statement in question identified them, defamed their character,
and was made with actual malice - "knowledge that it was false or with
the competition of the market..." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. "There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true because,
with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the
purpose of not permitting its refutation." MILL, supra note 14, at 18.
Mill's belief that truth must be tested through debate and conflict also provides a
justification for the adversarial process which is the basis of American litigation.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. ld. at 270 (citations omitted).
19. The common law required the following elements to create liability for defamation:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976). A defamatory communication was defined
as one that "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." laL § 559.
Defamatory statements under the common law were presumptively false because the law
assumed people had good reputations. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
770 (1986). The Sullivan case and subsequent decisions arguably removed this presumption.
See i at 775.
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reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' ° The actual malice
showing had to be made with "convincing clarity."'" The decision
effectively shifted the burden of proof to public-official plaintiffs; the
media's ability to prove the truth of the offending statement was no
longer a necessary defense. In media and academic circles, the Sullivan
standard is generally, but not universally, viewed as an important
safeguard to the press' ability to report on controversial government
activities .22
In 1967, the Court extended the actual malice standard to encompass
non-elected public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.23 The case
held that public figures - whether they achieved this status by position
alone, or by thrusting themselves into the middle of a public controversy
- were entitled to less protection than the average private citizen, but
should receive more protection than was provided to public officials
under the actual malice standard.' The public figure could succeed in a
libel suit by demonstrating "a defamatory falsehood whose substance
makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers."'  The Court extended the actual malice test to
public figures 26 because their prominent positions rendered them
functional equivalents of government officials. Thus, if the marketplace
of ideas were to function properly, journalists had to be able to report
activities of public figures without fear of unwarranted libel suits.
The public figure standard was later extended in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia27 to include private persons caught up in matters of public
20. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
21. Id at 285-86.
22. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 194 (arguing the decision "may prove to
be the best and most important [the Court] has ever produced in the realm of freedom of
speech"). But see LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 34-37 (1991) (noting that
allowing the press more latitude for false reporting on public officials may ultimately injure
society); David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 487, 538
(1991) ("[It is now clear that however useful [the actual malice] rule may be, the costs it
imposes on reputation, on public life, and on the press are substantial.").
23. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
24. Id at 154-55.
25. Id at 155.
26. Wally Butts was the athletic director at the University of Georgia. Id. at 135. In the
companion case of Associated Press v. Walker, General Edwin Walker was a retired Army
officer who was involved in the controversy surrounding the entry of James Meredith into the
University of Mississippi. Id at 140.
27. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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interest, even if their involvement was involuntary.2" This decision
effectively placed the burden of proving actual malice on all libel
plaintiffs, regardless of their status, because, arguably, whatever editors
chose to put in their newspaper was a public issue.
In 1974, the Court pulled back from its expansive definition of public
figures in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.29 In Gertz, the Court rejected the
public issue standard and held that plaintiffs who were not public figures
could prevail by showing negligence on the part of the media defendant
in reporting a defamatory statement. 30 The Court also ruled that public
figures were not necessarily public figures at all times or in all aspects of
their lives.3' States were to decide whether defamatory statements, made
against private individuals or public figures in their capacities as private
citizens, could be judged under the negligence standard rather than the
Sullivan actual malice standard.32  Private-citizen plaintiffs, however,
would not be able to recover punitive damages if they could not prove
actual malice on the part of the media defendant. 33 Thus, the decision
balanced the need to compensate wronged plaintiffs with the desire to
avoid punishing the press unnecessarily for investigating and reporting on
controversial issues.
The Court's commitment in Sullivan and its progeny to the market-
place-of-ideas approach to libel law underscores a key philosophical
difference between the United States and Japan in this area. In the
United States, the injury an individual might suffer at the hands of
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate" is viewed as an unfortunate
byproduct of free speech.34 Although people may complain privately
about the media's power to injure individual reputations, litigants tend to
28. Id. at 41-48.
29. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
30. Id. at 345-48.
31. Id. at 345, 351-52.
32. Id. at 347. The Court determined that private figures, and those acting in the capacity
of private figures, deserved more protection than public officials because "public officials and
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than
private individuals normally enjoy." Id at 344. The difficulty of determining the plaintiff's
status as a public or private figure has led the Court to make some rather fine distinctions. See,
e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)(holding that a Palm Beach socialite was not
a public figure simply because she was undergoing a divorce).
33. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. The Court has since held that showing actual malice is
unnecessary for winning recovery of punitive damages in cases involving a private-figure
plaintiff and speech of purely private concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
34. See BOLLINGER, supra note 22, at 37. ("[T]he Supreme Court today seems intent on
ignoring the public dimension of the harmfulness of this kind of speech. The costs are
regarded as exclusively private.").
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recover in libel actions only when the media's behavior is truly egre-
gious. 35 Moreover, the focus of the lawsuits tends to center on damages
and the public-private status of the plaintiff.36  In Japan, on the other
hand, litigation tends to focus more on restoring the injured individual's
place in society.37
The tendency in the United States to view the consequences of
defamation in terms of purely private costs may have its roots in the
American conception of the press and American history itself. A popular
theory of the First Amendment's origin holds that the Constitution's
drafters sought to prohibit the government from censoring publishers
through a mandatory licensing system. 38 Thus, while the press in some
nations acts as either an advocate or an official organ for the govern-
ment,39 the American mainstream media strives to act as a watchdog over
government, sitting as the celebrated Fourth Estate - a quasi-branch of
government serving as a check on the other three.' The public expects
that in fulfilling its watchdog role, the press will remain independent of
government control, neutral in its retelling of the facts,4 and beyond
societal conventions. 42 A coopted press is thought to be unable to point
out society's shortcomings. Although the public may complain at times
about some of the guerilla methods reporters use to obtain information,'
35. Although plaintiffs who successfully get their cases before ajury tend to recover more
than half of the time, a large proportion of U.S. libel decisions are overturned on appeal. See
James C. Goodale, Survey of Recent Media Verdicts, Their Disposition on Appeal, and Media
Defense Costs, in MEDIA INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1985, at 69, 81-86 (John C.
Lankenau ed., 1985). It is interesting to note, however, that only about 24% of the libel cases
filed in the United States between 1974 and 1984 went to trial. See BEZANSON et al., supra
note 10, at 130.
36. BEZANSON et al., supra note 10, at 122-23.
37. See generally, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 320 (discussing the
importance of a sincere apology as a remedy for defamation).
38. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18, 499 (4th prtg.
1948) (discussing the termination of press licensing laws in England and the American
colonies); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-18 (1931).
39. The government-operated press of the former Soviet Union is one example. More
contemporary examples include the state-controlled media in Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
40. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 22, at 55-57 (discussing the popular view of the
autonomous press).
41. Note the widespread criticism NBC received after the public learned that its news
division implanted incendiary devices on a General Motors' pickup truck to ensure the vehicle
would burst into flames during a news report on a potential flaw in the truck's design. See
Carleton R. Bryant, Staging the News; NBC's Bang May Spark Scorn for All Media, WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at A3; Jim Kenzie, NBC Truck Fiasco Shows TV Journalism at Worst,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 13, 1993, at G3; Pat Widder, Playing With Fire: Blur of Fact and
Fiction Costs NBC, CHI. TRIa., Feb. 11, 1993, at 1.
42. See BOLLINGER, supra note 22, at 55.
43. Consider the widespread discussion prompted by the Miami Herald's reporting of the
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people have generally come to expect journalists to operate at the fringes
of convention. Popular culture reinforces this impression with movies
that portray intrepid reporters who will get the scoop by any means
necessary.'
Thus, the United States has tilted the balance between enhancing the
media's ability to publish controversial information and protecting the
individual's right to safeguard one's reputation in favor of the press. The
actual malice standard, as applied by U.S. courts, limits the ability of
public officials and public figures to challenge the publication of
allegedly false and defamatory information by imposing on them the
burden of proving that the publisher was reckless in publishing the
information.45 While this approach clearly helps the media gather the
news, it does little to promote the accuracy of information entering the
marketplace of ideas.4 Arguably then, the U.S. actual malice standard
falls short of enhancing the press' role in fostering a truthful exchange of
ideas and improving the quality of public debate. As Professor Bollinger
argues, the public has an interest in not being misled by falsehoods.47
Incorrect information and innuendo can cause harm by leading the public
wrongly to vote qualified public officials out of office. Otherwise strong
candidates may steer away from public life because they do not wish to
bear the costs of potentially damaging statements about them in the
press.48 While protecting press freedom is clearly central to the workings
of democracy, society does not benefit when the incentive to report the
news accurately is diminished.
Furthermore, because the U.S. approach views defamation in purely
private terms, the monetary awards granted successful libel plaintiffs do
not address the need to repair the injured party's reputation or restore that
Gary Hart-Donna Rice affair in 1987. After the Democratic presidential hopeful publicly
challenged the media to catch him engaging in his oft-rumored practice of marital infidelity,
two Herald reporters staked-out his home and reported that he spent much of one weekend with
Rice, a 29-year-old model and actress. Although many journalists agreed they would have
followed such a story, several questioned the methods used in obtaining the information.
Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Editors Back Reporting Hart Allegations; Some Question Methods and
Thoroughness of Miami Writers, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1987, at 15; see also David S. Broder,
The Press is on Shaky Ground, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1987, at C7.
44. See, e.g., ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner Bros. 1976) (Hollywood account of the
Washington Post's coverage of Watergate).
45. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
46. Most libel litigation in the United States focuses on the status of the plaintiff, rather
than the veracity of the alleged defamation. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
47. BOLLINGER, supra note 22, at 35.
48. d. See also Anderson, supra note 22, at 531 ("The actual malice rule obviously deters
participation in public life.") (citation omitted).
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person's place in society.49 Although money may help salve one's
injured pride, it does not correct the misstatement that created the injury
in the first place. Despite the compensation, the defamatory falsehood
remains in the public debate, and the individual's reputation remains
unvindicated. Society, in turn, is impaired because its members lack
accurate information with which to make decisions, and some of its
citizens suffer the unfair stigma of a wrongfully damaged reputation.
B. Japanese Libel Law: Truth as a Defense
While the United States' approach to libel embraces the notion of
competitive ideas and individual injury in the diverse marketplace of
ideas,"° the Japanese vision focuses upon restoring the injured individual's
reputation in a homogeneous, cohesive society. As discussed previously,
U.S. law views libel in terms of the injured individual vis-h-vis the media
defendant.5 In contrast, Japanese law regards defamation more in terms
of the effect it has on reducing respect for the individual in the communi-
ty, or lowering the person in the estimation of others. 52 This treatment
is based on Japan's cultural emphasis on group cohesion over personal
autonomy, and is manifested in the remedies afforded libeled parties
under Japanese law, including public apology.53 In short, although the
Japanese press enjoys a great deal of autonomy, 54 the legal balance
between press freedom and individual reputation tilts more toward the
latter than in the United States.
The development of Japanese society is greatly responsible for this
difference. Unlike the expansionist spirit that marked the development
of U.S. society, Japanese culture developed within strictly defined
boundaries. The island nation's physical isolation from the rest of Asia
forced the Japanese to promote group survival over personal aspirations.
This insulation and group reliance, in turn, helped create a society that
was homogenous in its ideas
55 and meticulous in its actions.
56
49. Anderson, supra note 22, at 524.
50. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
52. Masao Horibe, Press Law in Japan, in PRESS LAW, supra note 2, at 315, 327.
53. See MINPO [Civil Code] arts. 709, 710 (Japan), translated in BEER, supra note 10, at
319.
54. See Horibe, supra note 52, at 334.
55. Yosiyuki Noda, Nihon-Jin No Seikaaku To Sono Ho-Kannen [The Character of the
Japanese People and Their Conception of Law], excerpted and translated in JAPANESE LEGAL
SYsTEM, supra note 7, at 296.
56. See ISAIAH BEN-DASAN, THE JAPANESE AND THE JEWS (R.L. Gage trans., 1972),
excerpted in JAPANESE LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 7, at 288.
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Japan's national passion for discipline and exactitude is rooted in the
nation's strategic approach to agriculture." Rice is a main staple in the
Japanese diet, and for centuries the Japanese economy - like that of
most other nations - was primarily agrarian.58  Before trade routes
developed, Japan was forced to rely upon its farmers to produce virtually
all of the rice necessary to feed its people. In order to ensure an
adequate harvest, Japanese farmers relied scrupulously upon a nationally
proscribed schedule for food production.59 That is to say, during much
of its history, most Japanese people were engaged in the same activities
at the same time.6"
These conditions helped create a cultural greenhouse that fostered the
growth of a natural homogeneity of thinking.6' According to the Japanese
scholar Yosiyuki Noda, "the Japanese take it for granted, almost
unconsciously, that the people around them see things in the same light
or have the same view as they do." 62 The expectation that everyone
shares similar attitudes and beliefs manifests itself in what Noda describes
as the Japanese tendency to accept unproven assertions as self-evident.
63
In other words, when everyone believes the same sorts of things, it is
unnecessary to explain or prove that which society as a whole already
understands. Consequently, "what others think" becomes synonymous
with societally correct behavior,64 and the importance of national
consensus discourages nonconforming attitudes and positions.
Japanese libel laws reflect this cultural tendency toward conformity.
As Professor Beer notes, the conflict between press freedom and Japan's
traditional group-oriented culture can both enhance and diminish the
rights of individuals. While the law's emphasis may center on restoring
the defamed person's position in society, Japanese cultural tradition
arguably views good name and privacy more in terms of group interac-
57. JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 287.
58. During the Middle Ages, 85% of Japan's population was engaged in farming activities.
Id. at 288.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Noda, supra note 55, at 296.
62. Id.
63. Id. Noda writes:
We often hear people say that such and such a thing is self-evident, suggesting that it is
acceptable without the necessity of proof .... So unquestioningly, in fact, do we
Japanese accept things as self-evident that we understand (at least we believe we
understand) practically everything without any explanation or proof.
64. Ua at 297.
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tion than in terms of the individual's rights as a member of that society.6s
Thus, the "right" of a national readership of aggressive, and occasionally
overzealous, reporting is protected to a high degree, 66 just as it is in the
United States. The difference, however, between the U.S. and Japanese
approaches is found in the methods the Japanese courts use to correct the
harm done to individuals by libelous reporting.
Article XXI of the Japanese Constitution outlines broad press
protection similar to that found in the U.S. First Amendment. 67 Because
Japan operates under a civil law system,68 defamation and libel also
receive detailed attention under both the Japanese Civil and Criminal
Codes. 69 The Japanese system theoretically prefers civil libel suits over
criminal prosecutions except in extreme cases."0 In reality, however,
injured parties resort more often to criminal prosecution, perhaps because
the costs of civil litigation are much higher, and the civil damages
awarded are usually nominal. Moreover, "the injured party is usually
more interested in prompt vindication than in monetary compensation,'
and such vindication comes more swiftly when pursuing a remedy under
the criminal system. As discussed below, although the American libel
plaintiff often has similar motives, the U.S. court system arguably lacks
the means to correct the falsehood promptly.72
65. BEER, supra note 10, at 318.
66. Id.
67. KENPO [Constitution] art. XXI (Japan), translated in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12.
The similarity between the U.S. and Japanese constitutions is not surprising. Members of
General Douglas MacArthur's staff drafted Japan's modern constitution during the Allied
Occupation after World War II. Ukai, supra note 1, at 115.
68. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS,
I961-7o, at 8 (Hiroshi Itoh & Lawrence W. Beer eds,, 1978) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
CASE LAW]. Japan's pre-1945 constitution and laws were heavily influenced by the French and
German legal traditions. The country's present judicial system was designed by U.S. and
Japanese Occupation agencies after World War II. Id. For an explanation of the importance
between civil law-common law distinctions, see generally JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION (2d ed. 1985).
69. Although once common in the United States, Sullivan's constitutionalization of libel
law essentially ended U.S. criminal libel prosecutions. Shortly after deciding Sullivan, the
Supreme Court voided a Louisiana criminal statute on its face in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964). The Court noted:
Changing mores and the virtual disappearance of criminal libel prosecutions lend support
to the observation that ".... under modern conditions, when the rule of law is generally
accepted as a substitute for private physical measures, it can hardly be urged that the
maintenance of peace requires a criminal prosecution for private defamation."
Id. at 69 (citation omitted).
70. Lawrence W. Beer, Defamation, Privacy, and Freedom of Expression in Japan, 5 LAW
IN JAPAN 192 (1972).
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
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1. Defamation Under the Japanese Criminal Code
While criminal libel prosecution is discretionary in Japan, the libeled
party may ask the prosecution to indict the alleged defamer.73 Allegations
of criminal defamation, including non-media cases, comprise approxi-
mately three percent of all criminal cases investigated, resulting in
approximately twenty convictions per year.74 In general, the conviction
rate is much lower than for other crimes. Imprisonment is infrequent,
fines are generally low, and suspended sentences are often employed.75
Unlike the negligence and actual malice standards applied in the
United States, the Japanese Criminal Code holds the defamer strictly
liable for the defamation, regardless of the circumstances.76 Under article
230, paragraph 1:
A person who injures the reputation of another by publicly alleging facts
shall, regardless of whether such facts are true or not, be punished by
imprisonment with or without forced labor for not more than three years
or by a fine of not more than one thousand yen.77
Despite this seemingly harsh edict, the Criminal Code further distinguish-
es between ordinary defamation and defamation involving the public
interest. In public interest cases, courts have imposed a negligence
standard, rather than strict liability. This distinction, however, does not
diminish the force of the statute in cases involving private plaintiffs,
where truth is never an adequate defense.
Under article 230.2, the press can raise truth as a defense to libel
allegations "[w]hen the statement ... relates to matters of public concern
and has been made solely for the purpose of promoting the public interest
.... 78 A 1969 decision harmonized the Criminal Code with the
guarantee of legitimate speech under Article XXI of the Constitution. It
held that the press could avoid punishment for defamation on a showing
that it had a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that the statements were
73. Horibe, supra note 52, at 328.
74. Beer, supra note 70, at 193.
75. Id.
76. Horibe, supra note 52, at 328.
77. KEIHO [Penal Code] art. 230, para. 1 (Japan), translated in Horibe, supra note 52, at
328 (emphasis added). "The Act for Temporary Measures Concerning Fines, Etc., Law No.
251 of 1948, raised the fine to 200,000 yen." Id. at 337 n.58.
78. KEIHO [Penal Code] art. 230.2, para. 1 (Japan), translated in Horibe, supra note 52,
at 328. Information about criminal acts, public servants, or candidates for public office are
considered per se to be a matter of public interest. Id. paras. 2, 3, translated in Horibe, supra
note 52, at 328.
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true, in light of the surrounding circumstances.79 In other words, the
courts will not impute criminal intent, and therefore will not find criminal
liability, if the media defendant can prove that it believed the libelous
statements regarding public matters were true,80 and has made a good
faith effort to ensure they were in fact true.
The Criminal Code defines "matters in the public interest" to include
details surrounding the acts of accused criminals, and statements
concerning public employees or candidates for public office.8" In form,
this approach differs from the U.S. courts' approach to libel, which
focuses more on the public nature of the identity of the defamed
individual, rather than the subject of the defamatory remarks.82  In
practice, however, this distinction has not led to substantially different
results. For instance, the Japanese press, like its U.S. counterpart, has
been unable to convince the courts that the very fact of publication
creates a presumption that the reported matter is of public concern.83
Instead, the Japanese courts have adopted an approach similar to that take
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gertz,84 by holding that some private
behavior of a private person can be of public concern, depending on the
nature and potential influence of the person's private activities.85 As
discussed previously, the Gertz Court similarly held that a public figure
may not always qualify as such, depending on the nature of the particular
activity and the circumstances that led to the person's classification as a
public figure.
86
Despite the constitutional provision banning censorship, 87 Japanese
79. Judgment of June 25, 1969 (Kochi v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 23 Keishil 7,
at 259 (Japan), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW, supra note 68, at 175, 177.
80. Id. at 259, translated in CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW, supra note 68, at 177. See also
Horibe, supra note 52, at 329.
81. KEIHO [Penal Code] art. 230.2 paras. 2, 3 (Japan), translated in Horibe, supra note 52,
at 328.
82. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
83. In 1953 the Tokyo High Court held that a magazine article reporting a rumor that
several media executives had been bribed to keep certain criminal scandals secret did not
address a matter of public concern. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1953, K6sai [High Court], 6 K6sai
Keishii 367 (Japan), cited in Horibe, supra note 52, at 329.
84. In Gertz, the Court held that a public official is not necessarily a public official in all
aspects of his life. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351-52 (1974). See supra
notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
85. The First Petty Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court developed this test in a judgment
involving an article published in 1976 in the monthly magazine, Gekkan Pen, which charged
the president of a Buddhist lay organization with engaging in intimate relations with two female
members. Judgment of Apr. 16, 1981, Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 1000 HANJI 25 (Japan), cited
in Horibe, supra note 52, at 329.
86. Gertz, 318 U.S. at 345-46.
87. KENPO [Constitution] art. XXI (Japan), translated in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12.
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courts have exercised prior restraint under the Criminal Code in at least
one instance by enjoining publication of an allegedly defamatory
magazine article questioning the qualifications of a Hokkaido gubernatori-
al candidate and former Socialist Dietman.88 To protect his good name,
the politician, Igarashi Kozo, sought a court injunction blocking
publication of the piece in the monthly Hoppo Janaru. The Sapporo
District court and High Court agreed and granted the injunction. The
Supreme Court upheld the decision holding that, in some cases, a ban on
publication was justified when the "damage to good name could be
serious and that restoration of reputation would be difficult if not
impossible." 9  The Court refused to find that such an injunction
constituted censorship "because it was the result of the court's examina-
tion of an individual case filed by the concerned party." 9 The Court also
found that freedom of speech "is more likely to be abused through the
use of prior restraint" of publication, and held that such measures will be
allowed only in narrow circumstances.9 In this respect, Japanese
criminal libel jurisprudence differs greatly from U.S. libel law. Prior
restraints are especially disfavored under the U.S. First Amendment, 92 and
are not considered a permissible means for curbing potential libel.93
2. Defamation Under the Japanese Civil Code
The Japanese Civil Code views defamation as an unlawful tort.
Under article 723, courts may require a party who injured another's
reputation "to take suitable measures for the restoration of the latter's
reputation either in lieu of or together with compensation for damages."
94
Compensation, which is more completely defined in articles 709 and 710,
is the designated remedy for both intentional and negligent defamation,
88. ARTICLE 19 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11; BEER, supra note 10, at 324-25.
89. ARTICLE I9 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11; BEER, supra note 10, at 325.
90. ARTICLE 19 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11.
91. Id.
92. See Aviam Soifer, Freedom of the Press in the United States, in PRESS LAW, supra
note 2, at 97. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which struck down a
Minnesota statute that permitted injunctions against the publication of "malicious, scandalous
and defamatory" newspapers and periodicals. In reaching its decision, the court noted:
The question is whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication
is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed [under the First Amendment]. In determining the extent of the constitutional
protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose
of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints on publication.
Id at 713.
93. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
94. MINPO [Civil Code] art. 723 (Japan), translated in Horibe, supra note 52, at 330.
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and can include non-pecuniary damages. 95 In the spirit of article 723,
courts often require the offending party to publicly apologize in a local
or national newspaper. 96 Such an apology does not necessarily imply an
admission of libel, and is frequently used in out-of-court settlements. 
97
In this respect, the apology is not unlike the U.S. media's sporadic
practice of publishing corrections in an attempt to breed good will and
ward off potential litigation.98 In the United States, however, such
corrections - when they do occur - are voluntary and often appear
within days of the original publication.
Unlike the Japanese Criminal Code, the Civil Code does not have a
provision absolving liability for defamation involving issues of the public
interest. In 1958, however, the Tokyo district court applied the public
interest principle to a civil suit involving libel charges brought against the
Yomiuri Shinbun by an unsuccessful Diet candidate.99 The decision was
later upheld by the First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court.'0° It held
that even if the article was not entirely accurate, the newspaper had
avoided illegality because its reporters and editors had sufficient grounds
for believing the veracity of the information. Although the newspaper's
information was based on inaccurate police records, the Court found that
it had not engaged in journalistic negligence.'' In dicta, the district court
found that some private matters completely unrelated to the people's
95. The damage provisions, articles 709 and 710, further require:
Article 709.
A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is bound to make
compensation for damage arising therefrom.
Article 710.
A person who is liable in compensation for damages in accordance with the provisions of
the preceding Article shall make compensation therefore even in respect of a non-pecuniary
damage, irrespective of whether such injury was to the person, liberty or reputation of
another or to his property rights.
MINp6 [Civil Code] arts. 709, 710 (Japan), translated in BEER, supra note 10, at 319.
96. Other defamation remedies include: publication in a newspaper of a judgment against
the defendant in a civil suit, at the defendant's expense; publication of a judgment that found
the defendant guilty of criminal defamation; and retraction of the defamatory statement. See
Judgment of July 4, 1956 (Okuri v. Kageyama) Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 10 MinshO 785
(Japan) (Irie, J., concurring), translated in JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 320, 326.
97. Judgment of July 4, 1956, 10 Minsho 785 (Tanaka, C.J., concurring), translated in
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 320, 324; Horibe, supra note 52, at 330.
98. See Bill Carter, G.M. Suspends Ads on NBC News Despite Apology for Truck Report,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1993, at Al; see also infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
99. Judgment of Dec. 24, 1958, Chisai [District Court], 20 MinshO 1125 (1966) (Japan),
cited in BEER, supra note 10, at 320-21 (involving media allegations that an unsuccessful Diet
candidate was of Korean parentage, had been convicted of murder several years earlier, and had
given a distorted impression of his academic credentials in campaign literature).
100. Judgment of June 23,1966, Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 20 MinshO 1118 (Japan), cited
in BEER, supra note 10, at 321.
101. Id. at 321.
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judgment of a candidate's suitability should not be published against his
will. As in the United States,' °2 precisely defining what constitutes
"completely unrelated" to voter judgment has proven problematic. 3
Subsequent cases further refined the Japanese public interest test to
include three conditions. The media defendant must be able to prove
that: (1) the matter reported was of public interest;'O° (2) the information
was reported with the purpose of benefiting the public good; and (3) the
reported information was true, or the defendant had a good reason to
believe that it was true. 05
II. PROMOTING PRESS FREEDOM V. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL
INTERESTS
The key difference between the U.S. and Japanese approaches to libel
law is that the United States focuses on enhancing society through robust
reporting, while Japan pays greater attention to restoring the reputations
of defamed individuals. U.S. libel law promotes reporters' need to
operate with few restraints through the "actual malice" standard, and
102. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) ("Given the realities of our
political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about a candidate might be
altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks.").
103. BEER, supra note 10, at 321.
104. The First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court determined that "matters of public
concern" might include the private behavior of a private person, depending on the nature of the
person's social activities and the degree to which he or she influenced society through those
activities. Judgment of Apr. 16, 1981, 1000 HANJ 25, discussed in Horibe, supra note 52, at
329. The case arose after the Gekkan Pen magazine published articles in 1976 alleging that
the president of a large Buddhist lay organization had engaged in sexual relations with two
female members of the organization. The magazine editor was arrested and received a ten
month suspended sentence from the Tokyo District Court. Id. Note the similarity between the
Japanese Court's analysis of "matters of public concern" with the U.S. Supreme Court's
discussion of public figures in Gertz. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.
105. The courts take a rather rigid approach toward the requirement that the press prove
it believed the truthfulness of the information. In 1989, Time magazine was ordered to pay a
Japanese gynecologist 300,000 yen for having distorted her opinion in a 1983 article about
Japanese women. The statement, which suggested the doctor believed abortions are so common
in Japan that "it is like having a tooth out," was taken from a Kyodo news service report
published the year before. The Tokyo District Court found that Time had changed the meaning
of the Kyodo report by dropping the words "this suggests for some people" from the beginning
of the quote, making the doctor appear flippant about the subject of abortion. The court said
that because Time had not interviewed the doctor for its story, and thus could not have verified
the statement's accuracy, the magazine should have used the statement without naming the
source and with the introductory clause "it is said." Judgment of Nov. 17, 1989, Chisai
[District Court] (Japan) (English summary on file with Michigan Journal of International Law);
see also U.S. Magazine Ordered to Pay Damages to Japanese Doctor, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 17, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. It is noteworthy,
however, that the court ordered only 300,000 yen (approximately $1,300) in damages; the
doctor had sought 60 million yen (approximately $260,000) and a public apology. Time
Publishing House Sued, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Mar. 3, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File.
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privatizes the costs of inaccurate and defamatory reporting."° Japanese
libel law, in contrast, supports aggressive reporting to a slightly lesser
degree. The Japanese courts require the press to demonstrate a good-faith
basis for believing the truth of the disputed statement, and emphasize
remedies that correct the falsehood and restore the injured individual's
good reputation."° As a means of advancing both goals, the Japanese
system is arguably superior.
A. The Media's Ability to Report the News
Despite the courts' differing modes of analysis in the United States
and Japan, little evidence suggests that one nation's media endures greater
restrictions than the other. An American journalist would likely argue
that the U.S. "actual malice" standard, which is applied in libel cases
concerning public officials and public figures, protects the media more
than the Japanese standard, which requires the defendant to prove it
believed the truth of the alleged libel. However, this argument is
simplistic and does not account for various factors which impact any
possible chilling effect that libel litigation has on the media.
The phrase "libel chill" describes the vague fear that libel litigation
curbs journalists' zeal for reporting. The existence of libel chill is widely
accepted in the United States.108 However, the threat encompasses far
more than is suggested by the analytical approach employed by courts in
libel suits. Attorneys' fees, libel insurance premiums, and the cost of
defending a suit may contribute more to the elusive chilling effect than
the fear of losing.
Although the threat of libel chill was widely discussed in U.S.
journalism trade publications °9 in the wake of a 1979 U.S. Supreme
Court decision that allowed discovery into newsroom editorial
decisionmaking,"0 there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. press
has foregone certain types of news coverage because of the perceived
threat of a potential libel suit."' Nor can media executives agree whether
106. See discussion supra part I.A.
107. See discussion supra part I.B.
108. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 ("A rule compelling the critic of official conduct
to guarantee the truth of all of his factual assertions - and to do so on pain of libel judgments
virtually unlimited in amount - leads to ... 'self-censorship.").
109. See, e.g., Michael Massing, The Libel Chill: How Cold Is It out There?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV'., May-June 1985, at 35; David Zucchino, Publish and Perish: Libel and the
Little Publication, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., July 1985, at 28.
110. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
111. The effects of libel chill in the newsroom have been hotly debated. For examples
of the widely diverging opinions on the issue, see James Bow & Ben Silver, Effects of Herbert
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libel litigation has actually reduced news coverage of controversial
subjects.1 2  Those who believe in libel chill point to the infamous
example of the Alton Telegraph, an Illinois newspaper with a 38,000
circulation that was forced to forego appeal" 3 and file for bankruptcy in
the wake of a $9.2 million libel judgment." 4  The Telegraph is still
publishing, but has ceased much of its investigative reporting." 5 At the
same time, however, executives at some larger news organizations report
that their investigative coverage continues as usual, 1 16 and newspapers
continue to publish investigative pieces.
Still, the perception of libel chill remains. The availability of
compensatory and punitive damages has encouraged public-figure
plaintiffs'to seek millions of dollars in recovery," 7 and multi-million
dollar jury verdicts have contributed greatly to the perceived chilling
effect. Between 1989 and 1990, the average verdict in public-figure
v. Lando on Small Newspapers and TV Stations, 61 JOURNALISM Q. 414, 415 (1984) (nearly
61% of 312 newspaper managing editors and television producers surveyed in 1980 felt a
controversial libel ruling had no effect on their ability to gather news). But see Richard E.
Labunski & John V. Pavlik, The Legal Environment of Investigative Reporters: A Pilot Study,
6 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 13, 15 (1985) (1983 survey of 80 members of a select journalism
organization, Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc., revealed that 65% felt that because of
recent libel judgments, stories were "not being covered that ought to be covered"); see also
David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV. 847,
860 (1986) (citing statements from publishers about decisions to withhold controversial news
stories for fear of libel suits).
112. See William A. Henry III, Jousts Without Winners: After a Flurry of Major Libel
Cases, No One Has Much to Crow About, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 69, quoting media executives:
"We are no less aggressive," says Editor John Driscoll of the Boston Globe, which has
faced libel suits from three recent gubernatorial hopefuls. CBS News Correspondent Mike
Wallace, the on-camera reporter for the documentary that resulted in a suit by General
William Westmoreland, says, "I don't think that has chilled us for one instant as far as
undertaking tough investigative stories is concerned."
However others disagree. "San Francisco Examiner executive editor Larry Kramer, whose
paper recently won a reversal of a $4.5 million libel judgment, concedes, 'That lawsuit had a
very chilling effect on this newspaper.' In particular, he said, editors are far more cautious
about even sending reporters out to cover 'borderline' stories." Id.
See also Martin Garbus, New Challenges to Press Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1984,
§6 (Magazine), at 34. Garbus, a New York media attorney writes: "Press spokesmen routinely
deny that they kill articles because of the risk of libel, but the chilling effect is well known to
lawyers who work with the media.... More and more, I see unflattering adjectives removed,
incisive analyses of people and events watered down, risky projects dropped." Id. at 48.
113. Libel experts predicted the verdict would have been overturned on appeal, but the
Alton Telegraph did not have the resources needed to pay for an appeals bond. See Bill Bauer,
Media Liability Coverage; Underwriting Update, 90 BEsT's REv. 62 (March 1990).
114. Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law
of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1983). The Alton Telegraph eventually reached a $1.4
million settlement in the case through chapter 11 reorganization in bankruptcy court. Id. at 13
n.73.
115. See Massing, supra note 109, at 33.
116. See Henry, supra note 112 and sources cited supra note 111.
117. Anderson, supra note 22, at 514.
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defamation cases exceeded $4 million, a figure ten times greater than the
average verdict of $432,000 awarded between 1987 and 1988."8 One
study found that average libel verdicts are approximately three times
greater than average verdicts in medical malpractice and product liability
cases. 119
Despite the fear of losing a libel suit, however, the fact remains that
even though a large proportion of libel plaintiffs win at the jury level,
most media defendants win on appeal, especially if the case involves a
public-official or public-figure plaintiff.120 Even when libel verdicts are
affirmed, courts often reduce large damage awards.'12 Nevertheless, libel
litigation in the United States exacts its toll. The largest affirmed libel
verdict to date totals just over three million dollars.' The time and
energy spent in defending a libel suit can be enormous, 23 and libel
insurance rates have skyrocketed.'24 Furthermore, the costs of defending
a libel suit, even where the media prevails or settles out of court, can be
118. Alex S. Jones, News Media's Libel Costs Rising, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1991, at A28.
119. See Henry R. Kaufman, Trends in Damage Awards, Insurance Premiums and the
Cost of Media Libel Litigation, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1, 5 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) [hereinafter COST OF LIBEL].
120. BEZANSON et. al., supra note 10, at 142-43. In a study of libel cases conducted
between 1974 and 1984, Iowa researchers found that plaintiffs won at trial 61% of the time;
appeals were taken in 91% of the tried cases, and the media defendant prevailed in 67% of the
post-trial appeals. Id. See also Goodale, supra note 35, at 84 (citing statistics showing the
media's appellate success rate at 67% in 1982, 68% in 1984, and 60% in 1985).
121. See, e.g., Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
Actress Carol Burnett won a $1.6 million verdict from the jury in her $10 million libel action
against the National Enquirer. The trial court initially reduced the award to $800,000 on
remittitur. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A. County, May 13, 1981). On appeal, the total damage figure was reduced to $200,000.
Burnett, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 206. Verdicts upheld on appeal tend to range in amount from
$30,000 to $350,000. See LDRC Damages Watch: New Developments in 27 Cases - Five
More Million-Dollar Awards but Some Greater Success at Trial and Continued Success on
Appeal, LDRC BULL., Winter 1983-84, at 17.
122. See Brown v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993
(1988) ($3,050,000 in total actual and punitive damages in a public-figure corporation libel
suit). The Iowa study revealed that media defendants appeal 91% of unfavorable verdicts.
BEZANSON et. al., supra note 10, at 142-43.
123. Barrett, supra note 111, at 858.
124. Since 1984 "most individual media companies have experienced a 200 percent to 300
percent increase in their insurance premiums .... " Kaufman, supra note 119, at 13. Defense
costs make up 85% of payments under most media insurance policies, and are typically
included in liability limits. Deductibles, which are also included in those limits, range from
$5,000 to $500,000 or more per incident, depending on the size of the account and the loss
history. Bauer, supra note 113. According to Kaufman, who works at the Libel Defense
Resource Center, a New York-based media clearinghouse on libel matters, the cost and
availability of insurance "could have a greater impact on how libel cases are defended than any
substantive ruling by the Supreme Court." Kaufman, supra note 119, at 14.
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staggering. lz
In short, the cost of defending a potential libel suit may have a
greater chilling effect in the United States than the outcome of any
particular litigated case. When viewed from this perspective, the United
States' superficially more media-friendly standard may not provide the
U.S. press corps with any more protection than their Japanese colleagues
enjoy, even though the U.S. standard absolves journalists of liability when
public-official or public-figure plaintiffs are unable to prove actual
malice. Although plaintiffs carry the lion's share of the burden of proof,
the U.S. press is subjected to far more libel suits.
126
In some respects, however, the U.S. press does enjoy more autonomy
than its Japanese counterpart. Because U.S. culture is far more fragment-
ed and diverse than that of Japan, the American media, especially the big-
city press, arguably feels fewer societal constraints than the Japanese
press. 27 However, the restrictions felt by the Japanese may be attributed
to the media itself. Although the Japanese press remains independent of
the government, it engages in self-censorship'28 far more often than its
U.S. counterpart.
The Japanese media generally considers the following three subjects
taboo: criticism of the royal family, exposure of the relationship between
organized crime and politicians, and sensitive matters, such as the
treatment of minorities in Japanese society. 29 It is not uncommon for
125. The average cost of defending a typical libel suit is approximately $150,000, but a
protracted suit can run costs into the millions. Kaufman, supra note 119, at 14. In 1985 Time
magazine spent an estimated $1.5 million to defend libel charges brought by Israeli General
Ariel Sharon, and CBS spent between $6 million and $10 million to settle charges brought by
General Westmoreland after a 60 Minutes interview. Michael Massing, Libel Insurance:
Scrambling for Coverage, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 36. General Sharon
lost when Time was found guilty of defamation and falsity, but not actual malice. Arnold H.
Lubasch, Time Cleared of Libeling Sharon but Jurors Criticize Its Reporting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1985, at Al.
126. Between 1974 and 1984, 536 libel cases were brought against media defendants in
the United States. BEZANSON et al., supra note 10, at 96-97. Although corresponding figures
are not available for Japan, between 1950 and 1968, only "38 lower court decisions involving
criminal and civil defamation by the mass media were reported" in that country. Between 1965
and 1970, the Japanese Civil Liberties Bureau, an administrative agency, handled 128
defamation cases involving the mass media. The Bureau determined there had been a
"substantial violation of personal rights" in 41 of the 128 cases. None of these were litigated
in court. BEER, supra note 10, at 315-16.
127. It is not unusual in U.S. newsrooms for an editor to ask the newspaper's attorney to
read particularly sensitive stories before they appear in print as a measure for warding off
potential libel suits. Conversely, it would be unlikely for that same editor to call in an outside
party to determine whether a particular story or method of reporting would offend readers'
sensibilities.
128. ARTICLE 19 REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
129. Id. A 1973 survey of 1,900 Japanese journalists found that approximately 30% felt
there were particular topics about which they could not write, including minority discrimination,
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Japanese editors to agree to government-requested news blackouts, such
as the blackout adopted in February 1992 regarding Crown Prince
Naruhito's search for a bride.' 3° Much to the chagrin of the Japanese
press, the blackout ended in early January 1993 after a foreign newspaper
broke the poorly kept secret of the crown prince's impending engagement
to Masako Owada. The embarrassment caused by the scoop has led
Japanese publishers to question whether such self-imposed cooperation
with the government should continue.1
3'
Such self-censorship by the Japanese media should not be confused
with the chilling effect purportedly caused by libel litigation. The
Japanese Newspaper Publisher and Editors Association's decision to
embargo coverage of the royal courtship did not stem from the fear that
such coverage would subject it to lawsuits. Instead, it was simply trying
to act like a good corporate citizen by granting a temporary news
blackout where excessive media attention might have hampered the crown
prince's ability to find a bride. 32
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the Japanese media faces little
chilling effect, despite its stiffer burden of proof in defending libel suits.
Sensationalist weekly publications enjoy wide circulation in Japan,133 just
as they do in the United States. Few libel suits are filed in Japan'31 and
the awards are generally very low by U.S. standards.3 3 This is true, in
part, because societal controls are generally viewed in Japan as being
more powerful than legal controls.1 36  Although at least one study
revealed that many Japanese public figures consider themselves wronged
certain political parties, religious groups, criticism of other newspapers, and sex. See Akihiko
Haruhara, Current Attitudes of Newspaper Journalists in Japan, NEWSPAPER RES. Oct. 1973,
at 8, abstracted and translated in JAPANESE COMMUNICATION STUDIES OF THE 1970S, at
139-42 (Yamanaka et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter JAPANESE COMMUNICATION].
130. The Right to Know v. the Right of Privacy; Media Wariness Has Increased; Future
Cooperation Not Likely, THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, Feb. 15, 1993, available and translated in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See John Burgess, In Japan, the Inside Snoop; Photo Magazines Traffic in Sex and
Carnage, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1986, at DI; Geoffrey Murray, LuridNews Coverage is Raising
Issue of Right to Privacy in Japan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., June 29, 1984, at 9; Steven R.
Weisman, Japan's Weeklies: School for Scandal with a Curriculum Including Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1989, at A14.
134. See sources cited supra note 126.
135. Monetary damages for defamation in Japan have rarely, if ever, exceeded 1.5 million
yen (approximately $7,500). See Horibe, supra note 52, at 330. The largest libel award upheld
to date in a U.S. media case was $3,050,000, in an action involving a public-figure corporation
plaintiff. See Brown v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993
(1988).
136. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW, supra note 68, at 20.
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by the media, especially newspapers and pulp magazines, few have
actually sued for defamation.' 37 A cultural bias against troubling others
with personal problems and a general unwillingness to challenge a
semipublic authority may account for this reluctance to sue the media. 3 '
Thus, although the media defendant's burden of proof is greater under
Japanese libel law, cultural norms protect press autonomy by decreasing
the incidence of libel suits and lowering damage awards.
B. The Efficacy of the Remedies
The greatest difference between Japanese and U.S. libel laws may be
the remedies provided by each system. In this respect, Japanese law
seems more able to meet societal needs. As discussed previously, in the
United States the costs of defamation are viewed as essentially private,'39
and are remedied through damage awards. The courts have resolved this
tradeoff between personal interaction in society and the public's "right to
know" in favor of the media's need to operate with few restraints in the
"marketplace-of-ideas."' 1  In Japan, the law focuses more on restoring
the individual's reputation in society by correcting the falsity of the
offending statement,' 4' an objective underemphasized by the U.S.
system. 142
According to a recent study conducted at the University of Iowa, the
chief reasons U.S. plaintiffs cited for bringing libel suits included
137. BEER, supra note 10, at 316.
138. Id. at 317.
139. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
140. The continuing validity of the marketplace-of-ideas concept is called into question
by the fact that 14 newspapers have folded or merged since January 1992. Only 33 U.S. cities
have competing daily newspapers under separate ownership. See John Schmeltzer, Iowa Towns
Deliver Twice the News, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1993 (Business), at 1.
141. See LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 2 (John
0. Haley ed., 1988) [hereinafter LAW AND SOCIETY]. As Haley notes:
Correction rather than punishment or retribution is the principal aim of the Japanese
criminal justice system at all levels. Confession, repentance, and absolution are the
essential elements .... In order to achieve this aim, the authorities respond to an
offender's acknowledgment of guilt and expression of remorse, which includes
compensation of the victim, with absolution as a gesture of benevolence.
Id.
Although Haley's remarks address only criminal prosecution, they aptly describe both
criminal and civil libel litigation in Japan. As will be discussed, Japanese libel litigation
involving issues of public interest, focuses on the truth or falsity of the alleged defamation, with
the public apology serving as the major remedy. In the United States, most libel litigation
focuses on whether the plaintiff is a public figure, and which standard of care to impose on the
media defendant. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
142. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 524-26. Anderson argues, "[iut is probably safe to
say that no major legal system in the world provides as little protection for reputation as the
United States now provides." Id. at 525-26.
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vindication of their reputation, deterrence of future republication, and
punishment of the media outlet for publishing the alleged defamation.
Financial recovery was cited as a goal in less than one-fourth of the
cases. 4 3 When asked what they found most upsetting about the alleged
libel, most U.S. plaintiffs claimed that the defamatory statement was
false, and that they had suffered emotional, personal, business, and - in
some cases - political harm as the result of the publication.'" Signifi-
cantly, most said they would have been satisfied with a correction or
retraction and might not have brought the suit had the media outlet
complied with such a request. 45  But.because reporters often react
defensively to libel allegations, requests for correction are often ig-
nored.' 46 Thus, the number of libel suits brought in the United States
may be partially attributed to a desire by plaintiffs to mitigate their injury
through a public assertion of media falsehood.
47
The Iowa study's findings were supported recently by NBC's
unprecedented on-air apology to General Motors (GM) for tampering with
a GM pickup truck to ensure that it would catch fire during a "Dateline
NBC" report on a potential flaw in the truck's design. The automaker
pulled all of its advertising from NBC news programs and threatened the
network with a multimillion dollar defamation suit.'48 General Motors
agreed to drop the suit in return for the apology and other concessions.
Despite the threatened litigation, the automaker was clearly more
concerned about correcting the error than the possibility of recovering
.damages. As one GM spokesman put it, "We needed to have our
reputation restored ....
Despite evidence that libel plaintiffs sue primarily to restore their
reputation and correct perceived falsity, 'libel litigation in the United
143. See BEZANSON et al., supra note 10, at 79. Specifically, of 160 libel plaintiffs
surveyed, 30% said they sued to restore their reputation; 29.4% said punishment and vengeance
motivated their decision; 21.9% sued to recover money damages; and 18.7% said they sued to
stop further publication. It.
144. Id. at 27.
145. Id. Specifically, of 155 plaintiffs surveyed on this question, 71% stated they would
have been satisfied with a correction, as opposed to 3.9% who stated that only money would
repair the damage. Of the other responses: 1.9% would have been satisfied with an apology;
20% stated nothing would satisfy them; and 3.2% listed various other responses. Id. at 24.
146. The University of Iowa study found that nearly 78% of libel plaintiffs contacted the
media before filing the lawsuit and requested a correction. The request was denied in 64.8%
of the cases. Id. at 25-26. However, the Iowa study did not address whether the statements
for which the corrections were sought were actually false.
147. As Bezanson notes, "[m]ost plaintiffs win by suing, they do not necessarily sue to
win in court." Id. at 229.
148. Carter, supra note 98.
149. Id. at A21. The statement is attributed to William J. O'Neill, director of public
affairs for General Motors' North American operations.
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States under Sullivan's marketplace-of-ideas analysis does little to address
these problems."5  Instead of focusing on the truth or falsity of a
statement, libel litigation in the United States turns first on whether the
plaintiff is a public official or public figure, and, if so, whether the
statement was made with actual malice. Both questions go to the
standard of care required of the media defendant and neither addresses the
statement's truthfulness or the potential harm to the plaintiff.1"' When
plaintiffs do prevail in libel litigation, the recovery often comes years
after the defamation and in monetary form rather than repair of damaged
reputation.' As the NBC example illustrates, it is possible that more
plaintiffs would be willing to forego costly litigation if they could restore
their reputation more quickly.
Perhaps more importantly, the current U.S. analysis does little to aid
in determining the truth or falsity of the alleged defamation. Plaintiffs
face little risk, if any, that the truth of the statement will be confirmed
because so much of the litigation focuses on determining the proper
standard for judging the media's behavior.'53 Arguably, the current mode
of analysis applied in the United States constrains those whose interest is
in revealing the truth and favors those who would benefit from its
concealment. '-
The Japanese mode of libel analysis is better in several respects at
addressing reputational harm and discovering the truth or falsity of the
alleged defamation. This may be due, in part, to the Japanese conceptual-
ization of litigation less in the terms of victory or loss that characterize
Western lawsuits, and more as a means for establishing "a harmonious
situation with which both parties are neither satisfied or [sic] dissatisfied,
where there is no loser or winner."'55  Correction, not retribution or
punishment, forms the basis of the Japanese ciminal justice system' 56 and
is arguably part of the civil adjudicatory system as well.
In contrast to its U.S. counterpart, Japanese libel litigation is marked
150. See BEZANSON et al., supra note 10, at 105. According to the University of Iowa
study, 87% of the libel actions brought against the media between 1974 and 1984 focused on
issues involving plaintiff status and actual malice. Only 13% of the cases had truth or falsity
as their primary focus, usually after the plaintiff had met the actual malice and status issues.
Id at 106-07.
151. Id. at 105.
152. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 510.
153. BEZANSON et al., supra note 10, at 229.
154. Id.
155. Noda, supra note 55, at 306.
156. LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 141, at 2.
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by the spirit of apology.'57 Damage awards tend to be extremely low by
U.S. standards 58 and are often coupled with a mandatory public
apology.' 59 Although some question the effectiveness of the public
apology in deterring future media wrongdoing,' 60 much of Japanese
society still considers public censure quite humiliating.'16 Japan's lack of
a jury system' 6' may partially explain the different damages provided by
the U.S. and Japanese systems. Juries in U.S. libel actions tend to
sympathize with plaintiffs, in part because they often do not understand
the editorial process and are suspicious of many standard journalistic
practices. 63
Regardless, Japanese litigation, both in procedure and remedy, focuses
more on restoring the injured individual to his or her place in society than
on punishing the press through megaverdicts. As noted previously, both
Japanese' 6' and American 65 libel plaintiffs appear more interested in
vindication than financial recovery. A court-ordered apology achieves
this goal more effectively than awarding punitive damages.
Japanese libel analysis also addresses the truth or falsity of- the
statement more thoroughly than that of the United States, especially in
matters involving public interest. The Japanese courts focus on whether
or not the journalist believed the offending statement was true, not on
whether the journalist acted with actual malice in determining whether the
statement was false."6 Because Japanese libel law is less concerned with
a plaintiff's status as a public or private citizen, the courts need not
examine the plaintiffs status or the defendant's actual malice, as is
required under U.S. libel law. Instead, Japanese courts determine whether
157. See supra note 37.
158. See sources cited supra note 135.
159. The Japanese criminal sentencing procedures take into account whether the defendant
has repented for the crime and made efforts to pay damages. This practice arguably spills over
into civil defamation suits as well. See Shigemitsu Dando, KEIHO Koyo: SORON [Elements
of Penal Law: General Parts], 421-24, excerpted and translated in JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM,
supra note 7, at 319-20.
160. BEER, supra note 10, at 315.
161. Id; see also LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 141, at 2. Haley argues: "This element
of remorse in the Japanese legal process.., is a recurring theme throughout Japanese social
life .... IT]he apology ... reinforces the authority of the group by giving the individual
strong incentives to comply with the dictates of the group or to defer to those in authority
within the group." Id.
162. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW, supra note 68, at 10.
163. See Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of
Care, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 449, 450-51 (1984).
164. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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the matter in question involved the public interest. If so, truth is a
defense for the media defendant, which will usually prevail by showing
that it was not negligent in believing the statement was true. 67 Ascertain-
ing whether the alleged defamation was true, therefore, becomes central
to resolving the case.
U.S. actual malice analysis, on the other hand, does not examine
truthfulness as much as it does the media defendant's motives in
publishing the statement.6 ' The media need not demonstrate truth as a
defense in libel suits. Instead, public-official and public-figure plaintiffs
must demonstrate that the reporter acted with reckless disregard for truth
or falsity in publishing the alleged defamation. In short, the actual malice
standard provides the media with a shield for publishing falsehoods,
provided that the reporter was unaware of the falsehood at the time and
did not bother to investigate.
Determining the truthfulness of the defamation, however, is not
central to all Japanese libel litigation. The strict liability standard under
the Criminal Code 169 for matters falling outside of the public interest does
little to determine whether the statement was true. In such cases, the U.S.
model is superior, because under the Gertz standard private figures need
only show that the media acted negligently in publishing the defamatory
statement. 70 However, actual malice analysis resurfaces even in private-
figure libel litigation in the United States when the plaintiff seeks to
recover punitive damages. This, in turn, skews the litigation away from
determining whether the offending statement was in fact true, 17 1 and
focuses attention on punishing the media rather than restoring the
reputation of the injured plaintiff.
167. The court weighs several factors when considering whether the media defendant was
negligent in its belief that the statement was true, including: whether the journalist relied upon
an official announcement; whether the journalist interviewed all of the relevant parties; and
whether the journalist sought rebuttal from the person whose reputation could be damaged by
the article. Tips from anonymous or confidential news sources are not considered sufficient.
Professor Yoichiro Yamakawa, Freedom of Speech and Press in U.S. and Japan, lecture at the
University of Michigan Law School (Oct. 20, 1992) (summary on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law); see also standard of care discussion in Judgment of June 25,
1969, 23 Keishii 7, 259, translated in CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW, supra note 68, at 177.
168. See BEZANSON et al., supra note 10, at 105.
169. KEIHO [Penal Code] art. 230.1 (Japan), translated in Horibe, supra note 52, at 328.
170. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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III. INCORPORATING JAPANESE JURISPRUDENCE INTO
U.S. LIBEL ANALYSIS
The U.S. legal approach to handling libel litigation does not
adequately address the societal harm caused by defamation and does little
to address the truth or falsity of the alleged libel. Incorporating two
aspects of Japanese libel jurisprudence into the U.S. analysis would
remedy this problem to some extent.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court should consider retreating from the
actual malice standard in defamation cases involving public officials and
public figures in favor of the Japanese standard of requiring journalists
to demonstrate a good faith belief in the truth of the alleged defamation.
Modifying actual malice analysis would refocus the emphasis in libel
litigation on the truth or falsity of the alleged defamation rather than the
media's behavior in publishing it, thus fulfilling the goal of promoting
accurate reporting.
Under an adapted version of the Japanese model, the plaintiff would
have to plead with particularity: publishing of a materially false factual
statement 72 that (1) concerned the plaintiff and (2) injured the plaintiff's
reputation in the view of the statement's readers. 73 The media defen-
dant's behavior would be judged under the negligence standard applied
in Japan under article 230 of the Criminal Code and article 723 of the
Civil Code for matters involving public concern. Unlike the Japanese
standard, however, the plaintiff would first bear the burden of proving the
statement was false. If the plaintiff succeeded, the burden would then
shift to the media defendant, who could escape liability or mitigate
damages by demonstrating that it acted without negligence and with the
good-faith belief that the published statement was true.1
7 4
172. The new standard would retain the U.S. fact-opinion distinction for libel, which holds:
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but
on the competition of other ideas." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
173. Bezanson proposes developing this standard of pleading through a new tort he calls
"setting the record straight." The position argued in this Note departs from the Bezanson
proposal at the point where Bezanson argues in favor of a quasi-strict liability standard, without
addressing whether the media defendant can mitigate damages, or escape liability altogether,
by proving that it believed the published statement was true. See BEZANSON et al., supra note
10, at 211-12.
174. Placing the initial burden of proof on the plaintiff is not unlike the approach outlined
by Justice O'Connor in a case that involved alleged defamation of a private-figure plaintiff by
a newspaper article of public concern. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1985) (holding that a private-figure plaintiff had the burden of proving falsity on the part of
a media defendant in cases involving speech of public concern). O'Connor noted.that in some
cases, "requiring the plaintiff to show falsity will insulate from liability some speech that is
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This new standard would apply in all cases, regardless of whether the
plaintiff was a public official, public figure or private figure, and whether
the issue involved private information or matters of public concern. In
this respect it differs from the Japanese model of imposing strict liability
for defamation involving private matters. Thus, the emphasis of litigation
would be on the truth or falsity of the offending statement and actual
harm to the individual rather than the status of the plaintiff and whether
the media acted with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
Shifting to the media defendant the burden of demonstrating a lack
of negligence in believing the challenged statement was true is constitu-
tionally defensible under current case law. Although classic actual malice
analysis only requires the defendant to demonstrate that it did not act
with reckless disregard for the truth in publishing the information, the
standard has since been relaxed. The U.S. Supreme Court's 1979
decision in Herbert v. Lando17 ' allowed plaintiffs discovery into editorial
decisionmaking to determine whether the reporters and editors knew the
information they were about to publish was false. In reality, this inquiry
differs little from the Japanese standard 76 because it questions the degree
of confidence the reporter had in publishing the statement. An investiga-
tion into whether the media defendant was reckless in publishing the
information is not markedly different from determining whether its belief
in the truth of the statement was negligent. Despite complaints that
Herbert would inhibit press coverage,'77 studies conducted in the wake of
the decision found little evidence that it had any real chilling effect.
7 1
false, but unprovably so." Id. at 778. But because the Constitution requires the Court to err
in favor of protecting true speech in close cases, such a burden of proof allocation was
necessary "[to ensure that true speech on matters of public concern [was] not deterred ......
Id. at 776.
175. 441 U.S. 153 (19.79).
176. In writing for the majority in Herbert, Justice White noted:
[W]e are urged by respondents ... [that] requiring disclosure of editorial conversations
and of a reporter's conclusions about the veracity of the material he has gathered will
have an intolerable chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decision-making.
But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages liability for publishing
knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely what New York Times and
other cases have held to be consistent with the First Amendment.
Id at 171:
177. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued:
[H]ere the concern is not simply that the ultimate product may be inhibited, but that the
process itself will be chilled. Journalists cannot stop forming tentative hypotheses, but
they can cease articulating them openly. If prepublication dialogue is freely discoverable,
editors and reporters may well prove reluctant to air their reservations or to explore other
means of presenting information and comment. The threat of unchecked discovery may
well stifle the collegial discussion essential to sound editorial dynamics.
Id. at 208-09.
178. See Bow & Silver, supra note 111, at 415. But see Labunski & Pavlik, supra note
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Still, flatly rejecting the actual malice analysis would send shock
waves through the journalistic community. But even assuming journalists
do feel chilled by the possibility of becoming libel defendants, it is
unclear whether the blended U.S.-Japanese libel standard proposed in this
Note would increase their fears. 179 Several factors, including litigation
costs, damage awards, libel insurance, and the time spent in defending
libel suits, all contribute to the overall impact of libel law on the U.S.
media.'80 Because actual malice is a difficult issue to determine, 8' it
complicates and lengthens litigation. Some libel cases turning on actual
malice have run for more than a decade. 82 This increased length of time
increases, in turn, many of the other costs associated with libel litigation
that could contribute to the chilling effect. Furthermore, because the
proposed standard would obligate the plaintiff to plead material falsity,
an element not currently required under the common law tort of
defamation, 183 it would discourage frivolous litigation.
Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest the Japanese press has
suffered from libel chill because it must show it was not negligent in
publishing alleged libel.' 4 As discussed previously, much of the self-
111, at 17-19.
179. But see Stephen M. Renas et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect: Are
Newspapers Affected by Liability Standards in Defamation Actions?, in COST OF LIBEL, supra
note 119, at 48 (citing survey data that found that a change in the liability standard in public
figure/public official defamation cases would chill the media).
Although this survey revealed that a change in liability standard would curb the media
from publishing certain types of stories, the validity of the results is questionable. The
researchers in this study sent surveys posing four hypothetical scenarios to media organizations
asking editors and news directors whether they would publish the hypothetical information if
the actual malice liability standard no longer existed. The study focused solely on liability
issues and assumed that all other editorial decision-making factors remained constant. Id& at 45.
Only 220 of the 1,688 surveys sent were returned. Of that number, only 206, or 12.2% of the
population, were usable. Id. at 46. No evidence was cited indicating that those who responded
to the survey actually understood the differences between the various legal standards used.
Thus, the findings in this survey were based on a narrow, self-selected sample of a larger media
population, a flaw the authors themselves acknowledge. Id. at 47.
180. See supra part II.A.
181. See BEZANSON et al, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (15 years); Herbert v.
Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986) (12 years); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983) (14 years). See
also Anderson, supra note 22, at 510.
183. Defamatory statements under the common law were presumptively false because the
law assumed people had good reputations. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 770 (1986). The Sullivan case and subsequent decisions arguably removed this
presumption. See Id. at 775.
184. It is notable that in an abstract of 97 Japanese media research projects conducted in
the early 1970s, not a single libel or defamation study was listed. See HIDETOSHI KATO,
JAPANESE RESEARCH ON MASS COMMUNICATION: SELECTED ABSTRACTS (1974) (in English);
see also JAPANESE COMMUNICATION, supra note 129 (listing abstracts of 100 studies conducted
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censorship practiced by the Japanese media is voluntary.'85 Relatively
few libel lawsuits are filed against the Japanese press,'86 and damage
awards are much lower than those in the United States. 8 7 Some scholars
argue that higher damage awards would more effectively deter future
defamation than the compulsory public apology, but low damage awards
remain the norm in Japanese libel litigation.'88 Sensationalist weekly
magazines specializing in large photos and lurid coverage abound in
Japan,8 9 and printing unsubstantiated gossip is not considered unusual.,9°
Mainstream Japanese journalists have been aggressive in their coverage
of recent political scandals.'9' The subjects of such coverage have
complained about the weakness of Japanese media laws and have called
for reform, but little has changed in press coverage19z
Admittedly, the differences between U.S. and Japanese cultures
inhibit direct comparisons of the chilling effect of libel suits in each
country. The United States has a far more litigious society than does
Japan, and the existence of the civil jury greatly affects U.S. libel
verdicts. 93 Nevertheless, the Japanese media's experience suggests that
the proposed libel standard would not cause a marked chilling effect on
the U.S. press. Furthermore, introducing the new standard might lessen
the other side of the chilling effect - the number of qualified people
who decline to enter public life for fear of opening their reputations to
in Japan between 1970 and 1979; no study addresses defamation).
185. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 126.
187. See supra note 135.
188. See BEER, supra note 10, at 315.
189. See Burgess, supra note 133, at DI; Murray, supra note 133, at 9; Weisman, supra
note 133, at A14.
190. After the "Peeping Tom" press, as it is known in Japan, published accounts by two
women claiming to have had affairs with former Prime Minister Souske Uno, the scandal
magazines printed rumors of numerous other unidentified women linked with the Prime
Minister. The resulting sex scandal eventually led to Uno's resignation in 1989, after his party
suffered a humiliating defeat at the polls. See Weisman, supra note 133.
191. See Roger Crabb, Tense Time for Miyazawa as Sagawa Scandal Unfolds, REUTERS,
Aug. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; David E. Sanger, Japanese
Party Warns Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, §1, at 7; Kaifu Demands Apology on What
He Calls Groundless Reports, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSW1RE, Aug. 11, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
Coverage of the parliamentary scandal has led both top officials and Japan's largest
newspaper to file libel suits against the Japanese media to clear themselves of involvement.
Politician, Newspaper in Libel Suits over Scandal Coverage, UPI, Feb. 25, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
192. See Murray, supra note 133; Hiroshi Nakamae, Libel Furor Questions Ethics of
Religious Group, Magazine, THE NiKKEI WEEKLY, Nov. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
193. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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attack. Although the number of members in this group is as
unquantifiable as the number of stories that have not been published,
society would surely benefit from their entrance into the marketplace of
ideas as well. 9
On the issue of damages, U.S. courts and legislatures should add
mandatory retraction and apology to the arsenal of available remedies
awarded to injured plaintiffs. In cases where an apology is ordered, the
plaintiff would be limited to recovery for actual injury, 95 and a portion
of both litigation costs and attorneys' fees.' 96 As demonstrated by both
the University of Iowa study and the recent NBC-General Motors
experience, plaintiffs threaten libel suits to vindicate their reputation.197
Plaintiffs tend to view monetary recovery, especially in early stages of
litigation, as less important than setting the record straight.'98 Thus,
adopting a damage formula that corrects falsehoods while allowing
nominal monetary recovery furthers the objective of setting the record
straight without subjecting the media to the chill of potentially exorbitant
damages. Granted, social censure carries far greater weight in a
homogeneous, cohesive nation like Japan than in a highly mobile and
pluralistic society like the United States.' 99 Nevertheless, the thought of
having to commit advertising space to admit wrongdoing publicly would
deter recklessly false reporting in the U.S. press. Furthermore, requiring
apology and retraction goes one step further than the Japanese damage
formula, which requires only an apology and not a correction, and which
does not equate any admission of wrongdoing with the act of apology.' °
Admittedly, the notion of court-ordered retractions and apologies
raises constitutional questions concerning whether a court can compel
speech under the First Amendment. U.S. courts have traditionally shied
away from requiring the print media to publish specific types of
194. See BOLLINGER, supra note 22, at 36; Anderson, supra note 22, at 531 ("The actual
malice rule obviously deters participation in public life.") (citation omitted).
195. Compensatory damages tend to be lower than punitive damages in libel litigation
because the plaintiff must demonstrate actual injury stemming from the defamation. See, e.g.,
Marcone v. Penthouse, 8 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (jury awarded $30,000
compensatory damages and $537,000 punitive damages; new trial ordered unless plaintiff
accepted remittitur to $200,000 punitive).
196. The court could set the percentage awarded for costs and attorneys' fees on a case-
by-case basis. Although this award arguably could merely substitute for punitive damages,
allowing some recovery of attorneys' fees would lessen the chance that the proposed damage
formula would preclude less wealthy plaintiffs from litigating their claims.
197. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
198. BEZANSON et al., supra note 10, at 24.
199. LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 141, at 2.
200. BEER, supra note 10, at 315.
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information"°m on the theory that those who disagreed with printed
information had the right to publish their own response. Still, requiring
mandatory retraction and apology is constitutionally defensible under the
principles outlined in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,' which upheld
the Federal Communications Commission's right to require fair coverage
of both sides of political issues in the broadcast media under the "fairness
doctrine." 3  The Court determined that such a requirement did not
violate the First Amendment because the finite number of air frequencies
limited the number of potential broadcasters. Thus, requiring equal
viewpoint access over the airwaves promoted entrance into the market-
place of ideas.'
Despite the Red Lion opinion, the Court struck down a similar right-
of-reply statute for newspapers five years later in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo2 5 on the grounds that it allowed too much
government interference into the publishing process. Although Red Lion
is not specifically discussed in Tomillo,2°6 the premise behind the Court's
differing standards for broadcast and print media regulation seem
grounded in Justice White's observation in Red Lion that "[w]here there
are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amend-
ment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write, or publish." 20 7 Still, the right of every individual to "speak,
write, or publish" is limited by the person's ability to circulate his or her
opinion to combat a falsehood released into the public domain by an
established media outlet. Given the dwindling number of general
201. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
202. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
203. Under the fairness doctrine, broadcasters "are required to spend a reasonable amount
of time covering 'controversial issues of public importance,' and are thereby prohibited from
airing entertainment programming exclusively." BOLLINGER, supra note 22, at 64. Also,
"when covering controversial issues of public importance, [broadcasters] must be fair and
balanced in the presentation of opposing viewpoints." Id. Red Lion involved an aspect of this
doctrine, the "personal attack" rule, which required a broadcast station that carried a personal
attack against an individual to give that person an opportunity to reply. 395 U.S. at 373-75
(citations omitted). The fairness doctrine has not been actively enforced since the Reagan
Administration. BOLLINGER, supra note 22, at 83-84.
204. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90.
205. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
206. The Court noted that a newspaper is not subject to the finite-airwaves limitation
confronting the broadcast media, but it rejected the notion that "as an economic reality, a
newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies
that a government agency determines or a statute commands the readers should have available."
Id. at 257.
207. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
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circulation newspapers left in the United Statesm and cable television's
ever-expanding range of channels,2 9 the ease-of-entry distinction between
print and broadcast media is now of questionable validity.
Moreover, a court-ordered retraction is distinguishable from a
statutorily required right of reply. Requiring a newspaper to correct the
injury it caused through libelous reporting is not the same as a govern-
ment mandate forcing "a newspaper to print copy which, in its journalis-
tic discretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom floor."1 As noted
previously, the new libel standard focuses only on factual defamation, not
defamation found in opinions,21' thus retaining the Gertz holding that
"[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.v
212
Awards of retraction and apology would be limited to libelous reporting,
and would not require the media defendant to retract editorial opinions.
Thus, journalists would not be forced to espouse editorial stances with
which they disagreed. For the courts to require otherwise would run the
danger of infringing the First Amendment right to free speech. Awarding
the successful libel plaintiff the right of correction and apology, therefore,
would not force the news pages open to anyone who disagreed with their
coverage. Rather, it would facilitate correction of inaccurate reporting
and dampen the skyrocketing attorneys' fees, damage awards, and
insurance costs that libel litigation entails.
CONCLUSION
Adopting a Japanese-style approach to libel analysis and damage
awards would provide societal benefits not achieved under U.S. libel
analysis. Libel litigation under a modified Japanese approach would
focus on the truthfulness of the allegedly libelous statement, rather than
the plaintiffs status as a public official or public figure. Injured
individuals would have their reputation restored through public apology
and retraction of the defamatory falsehood. Because the truthfulness of
the alleged defamation would be the central focus of libel litigation, the
media would be subjected to fewer frivolous suits and, under the
proposed damage formula, fewer potentially chilling damage awards.
Finally, U.S. society would benefit from a system that promoted the
208. Fourteen newspapers have folded or merged in the United States since January 1992.
See Schmeltzer, supra note 140.
209. See Elizabeth Kolbert, With 500 Channels, How Could Anyone Learn What's On?,
N.Y. Titms, Jan. 4, 1993, at Al.
210. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring).
211. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
212. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.
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reporting of truthful information and discouraged unnecessary litigation,
thus restoring the balance between freedom of speech and freedom from
libelous injury.
